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Electoral System Design and Ethnic Separatism
A Rationalist Approach to Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe

Eric Wesselkamper
Spring 2000
The resurgence ofnationalism taking place throughout Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union
raises important questions with respect to ethnic political mobilization, particularly with respect to the
potentialfor ethnic separatism. Moreover, the region provides scholars an excellent setting in which to
study the political effects ofconstitutional choices. This article, utilizing a rationalist approach which
emphasizes the cost-benefit calculus ofethnic groups, seeks to analyze the impact ofone such
constitutional choice, the electoral system. The competing theories regarding the determinants ofethnic
separatism are also examined. We find that the most importantfactor in explaining ethnic separatism is
the basic geo-political arrangement ofthe group, as measured through spatial distribution.

Within the setting of the far-reaching ethnic resurgence witnessed throughout
post-communist Eastern Europe, several competing explanatory frameworks have been
put forth to explain the phenomenon of ethnic separatism. Building on what March and
Olson (1988) refer to as the "new institutionalism," numerous studies have sought to
empirically demonstrate the link between institutions and the political behavior of ethnic
groups (Ishiyama, 1998; Pejovich, 1993; Horowitz, 1985; Lijphart, 1992; 1986; 1974;
1977). This article, operating on the basis of a rationalist approach, tests the effect of one
such institution--the electoral system. To what extent does the design of a country's
electoral system impact the political and behavioral calculus of an ethnic group with
respect to separatism? To what extent is separatism determined by the other calculations
about the costs, benefits, and feasibility of autonomy?

Theoretical Analysis of Separatism

Separatism (or secession) is a subcategory of nationalism that refers to an
organized attempt to establish a separate sovereign state. Premdas argues that the
determinants of ethnic separatism can be divided into two broad categories: primordial
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and secondary. Primordial factors include race, religion, values or culture, and territory
or homeland. Secondary factors serve as the "triggering mechanism of collective
consciousness" and include neglect, exploitation, domination and internal colonialism,
repression and discrimination, and forced annexation. Economic, political, and cultural
conditions can provide the objective basis in which these often subjective variables are
rooted:
Group demands are predicated on the empirically demonstrable existence of
commonalities in individual life experience. In the case of minority groups this is
determined by the constraints society imposes upon individual members....
These structural pre-conditions generate ... demands (Murray, 1983).
Thus the social, economic, and political setting within which national groups operate is
expected to have a determining impact on the development of separatist orientations.
Several theoretical frameworks have been put forth to predict which of these
societal conditions is more or less conducive to ethnic separatism. One such approach,
the "revised modernization" thesis, argues that separatist movements may in fact be a
product of the modernization process (Gould, 1966). According to this approach, with
urbanization and increased education, previously disparate groups are brought into
contact and competition with one another, creating a situational dynamic that fosters
ethnic tension. Moreover, modernization (and the process of industrialization in
particular) creates the conditions which facilitate nationalist resurgence by introducing
new infrastructure, transforming the political system, and changing the existing
distribution of resources. The importance of resource distribution is particularly salient
in the post-communist context, as the consolidation ofthe "dual transition" to democracy
and market capitalism is itself a competition for political and economic resources.
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An alternative framework discusses the concept of "relative deprivation" as the
primary motivating factor behind ethnic political mobilization (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1968).
Rooted in a psychological perspective, the relative deprivation theory maintains that
ethnic mobilization is a product of feelings of frustration, aggression, and alienation.
These feelings, at the most basic level, are a function of a differential distribution of
resources which leads to a sharp disparity between "value expectations" (in terms oflife
quality) and "value capabilities" (Gurr 1970).
Several other theories also emphasize the importance of these sorts of perceptions
in explaining separatism. The "internal colonial" school, for example, focuses on ethnic
claims of oppression and exploitation, which depend more on subjective perceptions of
relative deprivation than on empirically demonstrable conditions (Hechter, 1975, 1978).
It is important to note that in both the relative deprivation and internal colonial

approaches, inequality of economic standing and political power can only lead to
separatist sentiment under certain conditions of collective consciousness--that is to say,
conditions of conscious frustration.
Some groups are more likely than others to develop and mobilize this
consciousness. Important characteristics include the relative size of the group versus the
size of the dominant cultural pool, the existence of an intellectual and political personnel
base, the geopolitical arrangement with respect to the group's proximity to kin-states, and
the relative compactness and concentration of the group within a given territory (Gellner,
1983; Dutter, 1990).
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Empirical and Normative Considerations of Proportional Arrangements

Aside from these detenninants of ethnic political mobilization, another set of key
variables to consider is the institutional structure of the political system. As Mainwaring
notes, political institutions do indeed matter. Among other things, they "shape actors'
identities" and "create incentives and disincentives for political actors" (Mainwaring,
1993). Indeed the ability of political institutions to structure incentives is central to our
argument regarding the relationship between electoral system design and ethnic
separatism. Ultimately this issue of incentive rests on the most basic theoretical debate
regarding electoral systems: proportional versus majoritarian system design.
The empirical effects of electoral laws have been clearly demonstrated. Duverger
proffers a fundamental "law" (Duverger, 1963) which is here presented in a slightly
modified fonn as a group of two "tendency laws" (Sartori 1994):

Tendency Law 1: Plurality fonnulae facilitate a two-party fonnat and, conversely,
obstruct multipartyism.
Tendency Law 2: PR fonnulae facilitate multipartyism and are, conversely,
hardly conducive to two partyism.

Essentially, majoritarian systems make it difficult for smaller ethnic parties to gain
representation because, barring a geographic concentration of support, they need to win
pluralities of the vote in electoral districts (Lijphart, 1994). Such parties are therefore
more able to gain representation in PR systems which do not require first-past-the-post
showings, but instead allocate seats on a proportional basis.
This extremely basic empirical showing has engendered an enonnous amount of
literature on the nonnative merits of electoral system design with respect to ethnic
politics. While there are "neither widely accepted conclusions nor much conclusive
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evidence on institutional remedies for ethnic conflict," (Cohen, 1997) several important
propositions exist within the literature. One such tenet suggests that proportional
representation and the promotion of "group rights" are effective mechanisms for
ameliorating ethnic conflict in developing countries (see Osaghae, 1996), particularly
those countries in the post-communist world (Ishiyama, 1996). The"consociational"
school contends that representing groups proportionally fosters the integration of as many
subcultures as possible into the political process (Lijphart, 1974; 1977; Nordlinger, 1972;
McRae, 1974; Daalder, 1974; Lorwin, 1971). This integration affords the channeling of
ethnic grievances through democratic institutions and processes, thereby providing the
group a vested interest in the system. This vested interest in tum leads the group to
moderate their demands, mitigating against the more extreme separatist variant of ethnic
political mobilization. Cohen (1997) states the issue succinctly, noting that
Under proportional arrangements, conflict is likely to take more frequent but less
intense forms due to the institutional means available and accessible to
dissatisfied minorities ... They will use moderate means of resistance to effect
change in the status quo.
Majoritarian models, by contrast, do not afford and incentivize the institutionalization of
ethnic grievances. They are therefore inappropriate in ethnically divided societies
because they "systematically exclude blocs," which is " likely to result in violence and
democratic collapse" (Lijphart, 1985; Duchacek, 1977).

Electoral System Design and Ethnic Separatism: A Rationalist Approach
Another important resource-based approach to ethnic separatism is the resource
mobilization concept. This notion asserts that nationalism is basically a form of political
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power struggle over scarce resources. In this sense, ethnic mobilization is a political
resource and is therefore "rational" in terms of the cost-benefit ratio it entails.
Building on this theoretical tool, this article suggests that many of the determinants of
ethnic separatism can be integrated into one explanatory approach: the rationalist model
(see Becker, 1976 for example). Scholars have praised PR as an effective structural
mechanism in the management of ethnic conflict. However, there have been few
systematic efforts to specify the linkage between institutional structure on one hand and
political behavior on the other. It is here that Mainwaring's argument regarding the
ability of institutions to structure incentives becomes clear, for it directly relates to a
critical aspect of the separatism equation: the cost-benefit calculus of an ethnic group as
determined by a given institutional setting.
This rationalist approach rests on several assumptions. First we assume that an
ethnic group can best be described as a collectivity of rational, self-interested actors,
seeking to maximize their preferences. Second, we assume that the preference to be
maximized in this case is political power, a concept which entails control over the
resources ofthe state, including the civil service. And finally we assume that in the
process of determining how to maximize that preference through the structural constraints
and incentives afforded by the institutional setting, ethnic groups act on accurate
information.
With these considerations in mind, ethnic separatism, like nationalism itself,
becomes the product not of an emotional outburst but of a rational cost-benefit calculus.
This calculus is in tum structured by institutions such as a country's electoral system.
The logic behind this approach to political mobilization is relatively straightforward.
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Greater proportionality literally lowers the cost of winning a legislative seat. Small
ethnic parties, with the broader representation and expanded access provided by PR
designs, have a much greater chance of pressing their claims within the system. Therefore
the benefits of this vested interest in the political system outweigh the potential costs of
separatism, an always uncertain proposition. By contrast, in majoritarian systems it
literally costs more to win a legislative seat. Such systems, moreover, do not facilitate
broad representation and expanded political voice of minority groups. These systems
therefore incentivize separatism, as the benefits to ethnic groups would outweigh the
costs of the political limitations currently imposed by the structure of the system.
This sort of cost-benefit calculus applies to political, economic, and structural factors as
well. Political and economic marginalization of an ethnic minority obviously entails
certain costs. The costs associated with these conditions may be weighed against the
potential benefits, in terms of improving resource distribution (both political and

economic), that would be generated by secession. This calculus, furthermore, is
predicated on a component essential to any cost-benefit analysis--feasibility. Ultimately,
it is the basic structural arrangement of the ethnic group, in terms of such factors as
concentration and proximity to kin-states or regions, which is crucial in determining such
feasibility and therefore crucial in shaping the cost-benefit calculus of an ethnic minority
contemplating separatism.

Design and Methodology
As indicated above, this paper is interested in the relationship between

institutional mechanisms and ethnic separatism. Thus the focus here is not on all ethnic
groups but only those groups which are likely to be of a separatist orientation. This
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typology would include all groups that "define themselves using ethnic criteria (who)
make claims on behalf of their collective interests against the state, or against other
political actors" (GUIT, 1994). Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, the cases
examined are what the literature terms minorities at risk. GUIT defines a minority at risk
as a group that "collectively suffers or benefits, from systematic discriminatory
treatment" and therefore is the "focus of political mobilization and action in defense or
promotion of the group's self-defined interests" (GUIT, 1994).
The primary unit of analysis for this study is the "group-year," or the separatist
tendency of a given ethnic group in a particular year. Following Ishiyama's treatment of
ethnic conflict management, we have excluded from the sample the Russian Federation
and all states that were either decidedly not democratic, engaged in a protracted civil war,
or had no minority at risk population to speak of. This left a total sample of 21
identifiable minorities at risk and 52 group-years (See Table 1).

Table 1: Countries, Ethnic Groups, and Group-Years
Country
Albania

Greeks

Ethnic Group

Group-Years
1992, 1993, 1995, 1998

Bulgaria

Turks
Roma

1991,1992,1995,1998
1991,1992,1995,1998

Croatia

Serbs
Roma

1993, 1996
1993, 1996

Czech Republic

Roma
Slovaks

1991,1993,1997
1991, 1993, 1997

Estonia

Russians

1993, 1996

Hungary

Roma

1991,1995

Latvia

Russians

1994, 1996
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Lithuania

Poles
Russians

1993, 1997
1993, 1997

Macedonia

Albanians
Serbs
Roma
Gagauz
Slavs

1991, 1995
1991, 1995
1991, 1995
1995
1995

Romania

Hungarians
Roma

1991, 1993, 1997
1991,1993,1997

Slovakia

Hungarians
Roma

1991,1993,1995
1991, 1993, 1995

Moldova

Operationalization ofthe Dependent Variable: Separatism
The dependent variable, separatism, is measured using the separatism index
derived from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Dataset Phase III. The index scores a group's
political orientation from least to most separatist based on the following coding scheme
(Table 2):
Table 2: Measuring Separatism
Score
1

2

3

Description
"Latent" Separatism, meeting one or both of the following conditions
-Ethnic group was historically autonomous, or
-Ethnic group was transferred from another state, either physically or
in terms ofjurisdictional modification
Historical Separatism: The group gave rise to a separatist or autonomy movement that
persisted as an active political force for five or more years in their region of origin
(between 1940 and 1980).
Active Separatism: The group has an active separatist or autonomy movement in the
1980s or 1990s.
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Independent Variables
This model weighs the relative importance of electoral design in explaining ethnic
separatism. An underlying theme of the literature reviewed above is that differences in
the distribution of society's resources, both political and economic, constitute a necessary
precondition for ethnic separatism (Emizet and Hesli, 1995). To test the effect of political
arid economic discrimination stressed by the relative deprivation and internal colonial
theories, this study utilizes two index variables from the MAR dataset phase III. Both the
political and economic variables address the interactive effect between the prevailing
social practice and government policy (See Tables 3 and 4).
Table 3: Political Discrimination
0
I

2

3

4

No Discrimination
Historical NeglectIRemedial Policies--Substantial under-representation in political office
and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are
designed to protect or improve the group's political status.
Historical NeglectINo Remedial Policies-- Substantial under-representation due to
historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal
exclusion. No evidence of protective or remedial public policies.
Social ExclusionINeutral Policy--Substantial under-representation due to prevailing social
practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if
positive, inadequate to offset discriminatory policies.
ExclusionIRepressive Policy--Public policies substantially restrict the group's political
participation by comparison with other groups.

Table 4: Economic Discrimination
0
I

2

3

4

No Discrimination
Historical NeglectIRemedial Policies--Significant poverty and under-representation in
desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies
are designed to improve the group's material well-being.
Historical NeglectINo Remedial Policies-- Significant poverty and under-representation
in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social
practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group's
material well-being.
Social ExclusionINeutral Policies--Significant poverty and under-representation due to
prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are
neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination.
Restrictive Policies--Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression)
substantially restrict the group's economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.
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Aside from assessing the impact of these political and economic detenninants of
ethnic separatism, this study also examines the role of basic structural factors. Perhaps
the most basic consideration in this respect is the physical, geopolitical arrangement of
the group. The obvious reason for this is that collective action of any type requires that
there be an underlying "collective." A widely scattered ethnic group has neither the
incentive nor the practical ability to press for territorial reorganization. Thus the extent to
which an ethnic group engages in separatist activity is largely detennined by the
logistical consideration of group concentration. This variable is measured using a spatial
distribution index, once again derived from the MAR Dataset Phase III.
Table 5: Spatial Distribution
Score
0

1
2
3

Description
Widely dispersed
Primarily urban or minority in one region
Majority in one region, others dispersed
Concentrated in one region

Effect ofElectoral System Design

For the purposes of measuring the impact of electoral system design on ethnic
separatism, this study only examines the lower houses of the selected countries. Not only
are the emerging political systems of Eastern Europe and the fonner Soviet Union varied
in tenns of cameral structure (some are unicameral, as is the case in Albania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, and the Baltics), but in all ofthe bicameral systems, the lower house is
unquestionably the more powerful. Therefore, for the sake of theoretical significance and
comparability, this article only examines those electoral designs which govern the
composition of the respective lower houses.
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Rather than employ the measure traditionally used to determine proportionality-
average district magnitude (ADM)--this model utilizes Gallagher's Least Squares
measure of disproportionality (LSq) (Gallagher, 1991). Recall that the primary interest of
this study is how the effects of electoral system design impact the behavioral calculus of
ethnic groups, specifically with respect to desires for separatism. Therefore this indicator
proves to be the most comprehensive as it measures the degree of proportionality
produced by a given electoral system on the whole. By measuring the total effect of
system design all ofthe relevant structural features are taken into account (such as seat
allocation formula, electoral thresholds, assembly size, etc.). The LSq measure is
calculated based on the following formula:
L Sq=~ 1/2'2.( V,_S))2
Where v)=the popular vote share of party I
s[=the seat share of party I in the lower house

These four factors-political discrimination, economic discrimination, spatial
distribution, and electoral system disproportionality-suggest the following hypotheses
with respect to ethnic separatism:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the degree of political discrimination, the greater the
degree of ethnic separatism.
Hypothesis 2: The greater the degree of economic discrimination, the greater the
degree of ethnic separatism.
Hypothesis 3: The more concentrated the ethnic group (in terms of its spatial
distribution) the greater the degree of ethnic separatism.
Hypothesis 4 The less disproportional the electoral system (that is, more
proportional), the lesser the degree of ethnic separatism.
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Results and Conclusions

Table six reports the results of regressing the dependent variable separatism
against the four independent variables in the model specified above.
Table 6: Model of Ethnic Separatism
Variable
LSq
Economic
Discrimination
Political
Discrimination
Spatial
Distribution

Beta
.084
-.127

T
.683
-.944

Sig.
.498
.350

-.142

-1.118

.270

.490

3.679

.001

N=52
F=6.820
Sig.=.OOO
Adjusted R 2=.327

The results prove to be rather striking. According to our model, spatial distribution of the
ethnic group, the only variable to achieve statistical significance, is by far the strongest
factor determining ethnic separatism. Not only are the other variables relatively weak,
but both the political and economic discrimination variables are in the direction opposite
that predicted. This study therefore indicates that the greater the level of political and
economic discrimination, the less the degree of ethnic separatism. Disproportionality of
the electoral system, while in the predicted direction, is by far the weakest of the
independent variables and fails to achieve statistical significance.
The findings ofthis study therefore suggest several interesting conclusions. First,
it is apparent that fundamental structural factors playa huge role in determining separatist
activity. This makes intuitive sense. A widely dispersed group, such as the Hungarian
Roma (or Roma in general given that they exist in diaspora worldwide), will have greater
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practical difficulty in organizing and staging collective action of any sort. A more
heavily concentrated group, such as the Hungarians living in Slovakia or the Albanian
Greeks, will be more able to mobilize politically, and they may also have added help
from co-nationals just across the border. A wide scattering of people does not lend itself
easily to territorial reorganization, the very definition of separatism.
A second important point these findings reveal is that one must differentiate the
conditions associated with the emergence ofnationalist demands from the conditions
which affect the ability ofa given minority to mobilize around those demands. Both the
relative deprivation and internal colonial theories suggest that heightened political and
economic discrimination should yield ethnic separatism. The findings with respect to
both the political and economic discrimination variables could therefore potentially
suggest a curvilinear relationship. There may exist an "optimum" point of political and
economic discrimination conducive to ethnic separatism, beyond which a group becomes
so marginalized as to not even have the ability or resources to engage in separatist
activity. This interpretation ultimately affirms the resource mobilization theory of ethnic
separatism, emphasizing the nature of separatist activity as a political resource which
requires organizational skills, personnel, infrastructure, and other resources to manage
effectively. Political and economic discrimination may determine conditions of
nationalist mobilization, but they clearly do not determine ability to mobilize.
In a similar fashion, the surprising findings regarding the design of a country's
electoral system may likewise entail a curvilinear relationship with ethnic separatism.
Recall that proportionality, through its ability to facilitate broader representation of ethnic
groups, provides incentives to participate within the existing system of institutions.
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However, there might exist the potential for too much of a good thing. An extremely
permissive system of proportional representation could allow for a fragmentation of the
party system which would result in cabinet instability and deadlock, conditions conducive
to political mobilization of all sorts--including ethnic separatism. Furthermore, greater
proportionality allows for entrance of extremist right wing parties, some of which have
ultra-nationalist and xenophobic orientations. This political dynamic might also tend to
encourage ethnic separatism if ethnic minorities felt marginalized by the political forces
on the right. The complicated nature of these relationships and theoretical linkages
clearly requires further research.
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